Lebrudo vs Loyola

JULIAN S. LEBRUDO and REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO, Petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS LOYOLA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 181370               March 9, 2011

(Supreme Court, Second Division)

Facts:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution and Decision of the Court of Appeals.

The respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a 240-square meter parcel of land located in Barangay Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, awarded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. This lot is covered CLOA and is duly registered under TCT/CLOA No. 998.

On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased and represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo, filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, an action for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA in the name of Loyola and the issuance of another for the one-half portion of the lot in Lebrudo’s favor.

The PARAD dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that the case was filed prematurely. Hence, in 1996, Lebrudo re-filed the same action alleging that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989 to redeem the lot, which was mortgaged by Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Trinidad Barreto. After Lebrudo redeemed the lot for P250.00 and a cavan of palay, Loyola again sought Lebrudo’s help in obtaining title to the lot in her name by shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from her mother, Cristina Hugo. In exchange, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the lot. Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola. Loyola then allegedly executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving and transferring her rights over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. To reiterate her commitment, Loyola allegedly executed two more Sinumpaang Salaysay , committing herself to remove her house constructed on the corresponding one-half portion to be allotted to Lebrudo.

However, Loyola in her answer has maintained that Lebrudo was the one who approached her and offered to redeem the lot and the release of the CLOA. Also, she denied that she approached and sought help in titling, and that she promised the 1/2 portion of the said property to the petitioner. Furthermore, she rejects the genuineness of the Sinumpaang Salaysay.

The PARAD decided the case in Lebrudo’s favor. But Loyola appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it reversed the decision of the PARAD and ruled in Loyola’s favor.

Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the DARAB denied in a Resolution, and then petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA, where it affirmed the decision of the DARAB. Still Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

·         Whether or not Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the two Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by Loyola in his favor.

Held:

            No, the petition lacks merit for the following reasons:

·         The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions:

(1)  through hereditary succession;

(2)  to the government;

(3)  to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or

(4)  to other qualified beneficiaries.

In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws, and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions.

·         Petitioner is not a qualified beneficiary who is entitled to the lot under the CARP because he is not landless, and he is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary:

(1)  Landless;

(2)  Filipino citizen;

(3)  Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and

(4)  Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive.

Thus, the Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the Decision  rendered  and affirmed the Resolution of the CA.